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In a decade after WTO reorganized in 1995, the multinational cross-border merger tends
to be increasing. 'Many economists have kept much interested in the satisfactory
explanation of this phenomenon. Although there exist many articles on the merger theory
in order to explain why mergers occur, one of features peculiar to the cross-border merger is
the existence of asymmetric information between foreign firms and domestic firms. The
domestic firm often has the informational advantage on the domestic market which cannot
be known by the foreign firm in advance. In order to overcome this informational
disadvantage, the foreign firm may decide to merge with the domestic firm as a foothold in
the domestic market. We analyze how the informational advantage affects the merger
activity by the foreign firm.
The paper examines whether or not the international merger between a foreign firm (FF
henceforth) and a domestic firm (DF henceforth) occurs in the context of duopolistic
competition. There are already many articles on the international mergers. Long and
Vousden (1995) analyzed the relationship between the cross-border mergers and trade
liberalization and Head and Ries (1997) dealt with the welfare implication of mergers. Collie
(2003) analyzed the effect of the trade policy to the domestic merger. Although many
researchers analyze mergers in the international setting, the articles concerning asymmetric
information as one of reasons of mergers are relatively few. As recent contributions that
consider asymmetric information to the analysis of the international M&A, Das and
Sengupta (2001) examined the merger offer by the FF to the DF and analyze the bargaining
situation. They derived the condition under which the DF accepts the merger offer by the FF.
They examined the situation in which when the FF is unaware of the private information of
the DF in advance, the lower offer is attractive only for higher type of the DF, although the
FF shares the private information after merger under their setting. Banal-Estanol (2002)
investigated the incentives to merge when firms have private cost information. They showed
that sharing the private information enables the efficient production. Further, Qiu and Zhou
(2003) focused on the degree of product differentiation and showed under what conditions the
1 ) For example, according to UNCTAD (2000), which is quoted by Qiu and Zhou (2003), the value of cross-border
M&A increases from $200 billion in 1995 to $720 billion in 1999. The share of cross-border M&A in GDP rose
from 0.896 in 1995 to 2.5% in 1999.
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merger can acquire the merger profit.
However, most studies concerning the asymmetric information are based on the crucial
assumption. After the FF merges with the DF, the FF (and the entity that maximizes joint
profit) can share the private information that the FF could not obtain before merger, with
no cost. In the existing literature, the merged firm has the complete information. Our
motivation begins from the question about no cost of the information sharing after the
merger between the DF and the FF.
Different from the existing literature, our paper takes explicitly the asymmetric
information between the DF and the FF into consideration. The paper presumes that in
merging, the FF cannot gain the private information without cost. The FF need to give the
information rent for the DF in order to obtain private information. The merger activity
costs the FF the extra payment to the DF for information acquisition. We analyze the
situation in which in merging, the FF must offer the merger contract to the DF in order to
gain the private information that the DF possesses. The paper examines how the
information rent given to the DF influences the profitability of the merger by the FF.
We examine whether or not the international merger makes more profit than that of the
non-merger, paying attention to the existence of the ex ante asymmetric information. The
paper shows that the foreign firm always prefers to merge, even if it costs the foreign firm
the extra payment to the domestic firm and the output level is distorted in order to reduce
the information rent. Moreover it is shown that when uncertainty is sufficiently large, the
difference of the expected profit of the FF between the merger and the non-merger increases
with the degree of uncertainty. This result presents one of the explanations why the
international merger is more desirable when the informational advantage becomes more
important.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model and
derives the output and the expected profit of the FF in the equilibrium when the FF decides
to merge or not. Section 3 compares the output and the expected profit of the FF in both
cases in which the merger occurs or not. Section 4 is concluding remarks.
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2　Themodel
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In this section, the model is described. We consider the situation in which a domestic firm
(DF) has already produced in the domestic market and a foreign firm (FF) plans to enter in
this market. Before the FF enters, the DF is a domestic monopoly firm. As two ways of
market entry, the FF decides whether or not to merge with the DF. When the FF decides not
to merge, the duopolistic competition between the DF and the FF follows. The goods that
the DF and the FF supply are homogeneous. We stand for the DF and the FF by the
superscript i-d and / respectively.
There exists the asymmetric information about the demand size of the domestic market
between the DF and the FF. The DF knows the true demand size, but the FF does not. We
assume that the demand size has two values:　∈{&H, OL}, 9H>eL≧0; AO=OH-9L>0.
The FF knows that θH and θL occur with the probability P and l-p respectively,
0<p <1. These are common knowledge.2)
When the FF decides not to merge, market competition occurs in the fashion of
Cournot duopoly. The output level is denoted by q'k; i-d,f, k-H,L. The total quantity
is Q-q +qf and the inverse demand function is P{Q)-a+6k-Q. The production cost
is identical and denoted by c>0; a>c. The expected value of Ok is denoted by
百三p9H +(l-p)OL. The variance is calculated as a2 -p(l-p)(△6y. The profit is denoted
by x'(q',qJ)-(p(Q)-c)ql-(a+ok-C-(qd+qfw; i,j-d,f, j≠i.
When the FF decides to merge with the DF, the merged firm acts as a monopoly firm. The
output level is denoted by qm and the price is P{qm). The profit is denoted by
k (q )-{a+9k-c-qm)qm. When the expected profit of the FF in merging is larger than
that in not merging, the FF merges.
As a benchmark, we consider the complete information under which the FF also knows
9k. When the FF decides not to merge, both firms are engaged in duopolistic competition.
The reaction function of each firm is q'k-空色=直　The output and the profit in the2
Cournot-Nash equilibrium are q*-竿and 7i㌃-(?n -(辛) respectively. The
merged firm is aware of 9k. When FF decides to merge with the DF. The monopoly output
and the profit are q?-竿and <-feM)2-(翠) respectively. In this case, the FF
2 ) ok can be reinterpreted as the common marginal cost for both firms.
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and the DF prefer to merge evidently, because the profit of the merged firm is always
greater than the profit sum of both firms before the merger, 2#L* -至当控< ** -些盤生36
In reality, the DF is likely to know more about the preference and the trend of domestic
consumers than the FF. We proceed to analyze the incomplete information.
2.1 Non-merger
WhentheFFdecidesnottomerge,theFFdoesnotknow9k.Theyengageinduopoly
∽mpetitionundertheincompleteinformation.Wef∝usontheBayesianNashequilibrium.
TheprofitoftheDFisdenotedby7id
k(ql,qJ)-(a+6k-(qd
k+qJ)-c)qf蝣ThereactionfunctionoftheDFisasfollows:
d-a+Ok-c-q¥
Ikojk-H,Lこ(1)
TheFFmaximizestheexpectedprofit:方f≡E[{P昭:)-c)</]-(ォ+万-c-qJ-pli-(トp)qt)q,/3)
ThereactionfunctionoftheFFisasfollows:
fa+
q1-万IC-pqa
H-{¥-p)qaL
2(2)
Solvingthesimultaneousequations,(1)and(2),theoutputintheequilibriumisobtained.4'
(?」,」)-(蝣竿+旦二号誓,翠-掌qf-竿(3)
The following inequalities are immediately obtained:
qz,qg 91<Ii*, 11<11 <1 <1h <<1忌.
The ex post profit of the DF and the expected profit of the FF are as follows:
方d-( d,2-(2(a-c)+30k一万)2,万f={qf?=色亘二逆36　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　9
(4)
(5)
We compare the (expected) profits between the complete and the incomplete information
cases. By (4), itissatisfiedthat方孟>2漂, < <<* , and n{ <7i[* <7tf <jtfH* <方孟・5'
3 ) E[-] denotes the operatorof expectation on 6k.
4 ) Under叫e above setting, the solution is interior.
5 ) Note that when the demand is low, the FF makes higher profit under the incomplete information.
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2.2　Merger
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We analyze the acquisition of the DF by the FF. First we analyze two benchmark cases.
Full information without cost If the acquiring firm can share information with no cost in
merging, the comparison between the merger and the non-merger is equal to the comparison
between the merger under the complete information and the non-merger under the
incomplete information. The monopoly profit under the complete information always exceeds
the sum of the expected profit in the duopolistic competition under the incomplete
information. In deciding whether or not to merge, the FF compares the expected profit ex
ante.Theexpectedprofitisalwayslargerwhenmerging.Thatis,
x'+E[xa
k]<E[^].
Itissatisfiedthatn^-宅逆andE[x%]-p万富+a-p)4-4ia+万-cf+9a2蝣By
.1o
m.*k]-p*芸+(l-rt<-9[(a+否-cf+S],theinequality(6)issatisfied.
at
(6)
NoinformationWeanalyzetheotherextremebenchmark.SupposethattheFFremainsnot
knowingthetruedemandaftermerger,althoughthemergedfirmproducesasamonopoly
firm.
TheexpectedprofitoftheFFisnm-E[(P(す>)-c)q-]-{a+否-C-すm)すm.Calculatingthe
monopolyoutputandtheprofit,itisobtainedthatすm-竿andnm-{すサ)2-(.響)2・
WecomparetheexpectedprofitoftheFFwhenmergingwithwhennotmerginginthis
benchmark.Ifthefollowinginequalityissatisfied,themergerisdesirablefortheFFfrom
theviewpointoftheexpectedprofit.
方+」[<]<方m汀andonly汀J2<雪逆,(刀
whereisE[ft%]-p7Tz+(¥-p)7tL.Ifa2islarge,theFFexpectsthatthemergerisnot
desirable.
Ontheotherhand,theDFevaluatesmoreaccuratelywhetherornotthismergeris
desirablebycalculatingtheexpostprofit.
(p(Qk)-c)qf+{qd
k)2<{a+ek-百m-c)すmifand。nly埠(a+万-cf-%9k二万>o!(8)
36
Ifthedeviationfromtheexpectedvalue,6k-6,islarge,theDFalsoexpectsthatthe
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profit of the merged firm is less than the joint profit before merger.
Information acquisition in merging Now, we examine the information acquisition in
merging. The FF delegates the DF to produce the goods after merger.
When deciding to merge, the FF is not aware of 6k , but the DF is aware. The FF offers
the merger contract to the DF. The FF as a principal induces the DF as an agent to report
the demand type, 9k , and gives the information rent to the DF. The FF enforces the DF to
implement the output level of goods that the DF produces and the transfer that the DF
should pay to the FF. Our model applies the revelation principle, which is often used in order
to analyze the adverse selection in the principal-agency framework.6'Therefore, we limit the
analysis of the optimal contract to the direct truth-telling mechanism, {q(vk)>((vk)}kア{H,L}蝣
This contract form implies that when the DF reports the demand type as k -H,L to the
FF, the output level, qk , and the transfer, tk , are assigned by the FF. The offered contract
can be abbreviated as vlk^uk^H^}蝣The contract offered to the DF can be committed by the
FF. The monopoly profit when the true type is 9k and the type reported by the DF is 6, is
denoted by 7im{ql;9k) -(a+6k -c-q,)q,; k,l-H,L.
The objective function of the FF is as follows:
max E[tk]-ptH+(l-p)tL,
¥1k 'h }k={H,L}
subject to (ICH) n (qH;dHトtH ≧* (vM-t^
(ICL) 7rm{qL-eL)-tL ≧nm{qH-fiL)-tH,
(PCH) Km{qH;9H)-tH ≧7招,
(PCL) xm(qL;OL)-tL ≧方Ld.
???????????????? ??? ?
(ICk) is the incentive compatibility constraint. Note that the participation constraint,
(PCk) , depends on the type 6k because the reservation profit is the profit under the
incomplete information in subsection 2.1. That is, ^ -(^)2 - (2(fl-c)+3f?*-∂　When the36
6 ) The revelation principle is first propounded by Myerson (1979). This principle implies as follows: The direct
truth-telling mechanism can result in the same payoffs to the principal and the agent as the payoffs in any
equilibrium of a game in which the players play through any indirect mechanisms that the principal presents.
See Fudenberg and Tirole (1991, Ch.7) for details.
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reservation profit depends on the private information, the countervailing incentive is
possible to occur.7)
In order to specify the characteristics of the optimal contract, we solve the optimal
contract using the Lagrange multiplier. The Lagrangean is defined as follows:
」>(?*>',k'lk>右>Mk>{k=H,L})≡[ptH+{¥-p)tL]
+XH[{a+OH-c-(te+?L))(fe-?」)-fe-h)]
+XL[(a+9L-c-{qH+qL))(qL-qH)+(tH-tL)]
+fiH[{a+6H-C-9h)9h-{h-^孟]
+HL[(a+OL-c-qL)qL-h-^LI
Solving'thefirsLorderconditions,thefollowingequationsareobtained.
{H蝣P=*H-*l+Mh'>
t,:¥-p--XH+XL+/iL;
qH:(AH+jUH)[a+OH-c-2qH卜IL[a+eL-c-2qH}-Q;
9l蝣<A+〟'蝣L)[a+OL-c-2qL]-AH[a+OH-c-2qL]-0.
(14)
?????〔????????????
By (15) and (16), juH十Ml -1- Thus, either (PCH) or (PC,) binds necessarily.
If both of {ICk) and (PCk) do not bind, the principal can satisfy all constraints and
raise her expected profit by increasing the transfer of the original contract from tk to
tk+」;」>0. As a result, either constraint binds necessarily. Either ¥ >O or !Jk >O holds
by the slackness condition.
The optimization problem is classified into three cases depending on which of constraints
bind:
Case 1: (ICH) and (PCL) bind. (A.H,nL>0, XL-juH-0.)
Case2: (ICH), (PCH) and (PCL) bind. (AH>0,Az-0, /z^,^>0.)
Case3: (PCH) and (PCL) bind. (nH,fiL>0, XH-XL-0.)
The case in which both (ICL) and (PCH) bind never occurs. Hereafter, it is defined that
L-a+6L-c and H-a+9H-c fornotational convenience. Notethat AO-H-L.
7 ) The countervailing incentive is analyzed by Lewis and Sappington (1989) at first. When the reservation payoff
depends on the agent's type, the agent may report that his type is efficient in order to acqu汀e more reservation
payoff. In this case, it is possible that the incentive to report the true type works and the principal does not need
to give any incentives to the agent. As the reservation utility depending on the type countervails the incentives
to lie about the type, this is called as the countervailing incentive.
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Case 1 It is satisfied that AH-p and /uL-¥ by (15). By (17) and (18), the output level is
as follows:
Vh=
<?」 =
a+8H-c
2
a+8L-c一票
2
ItissatisfiedthatqH(-q芸>q")>qL蝣SubstitutingqHorqL,theprofitfunction,
方¥qi',Ok),iscalculatedasfollows:方¥4h;Oh)-菩xm(qL#H)=埋
4方¥qL-A) 生壁and方¥qH-A)-生壁吐
44
Bythebindingconstraints,(PCL)and(ICH),thetransferisasfollows:
tL-方¥qL-A)-方{-ア[5L2+4LpAO-P2{9+{¥-pf){
a-r>~¥2Aeya-pr
(19)
(20)
(21)
tH-h十去(笥2-孟[5If+4LpkO-(9匝2-i)+(i-/?)V)(△ey(22)
Intworemainingconstraints,(ICL)issatisfied:
tH-tL-吉(豊)2,方¥qH-A)一方¥91A)-望票欝>O.'(PCH)issatisfiedunderthe
followingcondition.As7rm(qH;OH)-7r孟-晋[21一也Ao]≧0,thenecessaryconditionto
l-p
satisfy(PCH)isasfollows:
2pz+p+3(23)
IfAOissufficientlysmall,(PCH)issatisfiedandthecountervailingincentivedoesnot
occur.
When(23)issatisfied,theexpectedprofitoftheFFiscalculatedasfollows:
ptH+(1-p)tL-tL+p(tH-tL)-孟[5If+4Lp△e+p{9-p{¥-p)){
¥-p△ey糾)
Case3Forthesimplificationoftheanalysis,weexamineCase3inadvanceofCase2.
InCase3,itissatisfiedthat!iH-pand!JL-l-pby(15).Asbothof(ICk)donot
bind,theFFneednotgiveanyincentiveatall.Thecountervailingincentiveworksstrongly.
8)増)2-讐譜-島,o・
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By (17) and (18), the output level is as follows:
1h-
9l=
a+6H-c
2
a+9L-c
2
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(25)
(26
It is satisfied that qH(-q芸) >qL(- q")蝣Substituting qH or qL into the profit function,
方¥q,;Ok) is calculated as follows: Km(qH;6H)-質,方¥qL;OH)-壁迎吐,方¥9lA)-菩4
and 7im{qH-6L) -生壁吐4
By the binding constraints, (PCH) and (PCL) , the transfer is as follows:
tL-方¥qL-A)一方d-(5L-PAO)(L+PAO)
L-36
tH-x-(qH;OH)一方孟-(5H+(l-p)AO)(H-(I-p)AS)
36
(27)
(28)
By nm{qL;eL)-tL -辛-(5I~rwi+im ^ 【(?J?;OI)-'ff -主宰-(5#+(l-p)*0)(H-Q-p)AO)ViH>"L> 'H-
(ICL) is satisfied: {nm{qL;9L)-tL)-(*m(qH;8L)-tH) -晋[3△0+2(a+万-c)]> 0. (ICH) is
satisfied under the following condition. By nm{qH;6H)-tH -早-(5//-Kl~　36　~p)Aff) and36
*m{qi.#H')-h -出藍(SL-PAOKL+pAe) | {7tm{qH;eH)-tH)-{nm{qL-eH)-tL)-晋K3-2/OAβ-21]≧0.4　　　　Jo
The necessary condition to satisfy (JCH) is as follows:
・o ≧す覧　　　　　　(29)
If A is sufficiently large, (ICH) is satisfied and the countervailing incentive works
strongly. The FF as a principal need not give any 、information rent that exceeds the
reservation profit.
When (29) is satisfied, the expected profit of the FF is as follows:
ptH +{x-p)tL - PSH+V-p)*W-(¥-p)M) + {¥-p){5L~禦XL+PAO)36　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　36
5(a+∂-cY
36 (30)
As the inequality,器急く毒, holds, there exists an interval of AOe[器票竜]
necessarily. When Ad lies in this interval, both of (23) and (29) are not satisfied. This case
is dealt with Case 2. The condition under which both (23) and (29) are not satisfied is
rewritten as follows:
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j岨≦△β≦烏・2pz+p+3
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(31)
Case 2　When (31) is satisfied, (ICH) , (PCH) and (PCL) bind. Under three binding
constraints, AH >0, AL -0 and !iH,juL >O are satisfied. By (15) and (16), it is satisfied that
Mh+Ml-1 and p=XH+juH. By(17)and(18),
1h=
Hl=
a+9H-c
2
a+OL-c+撃△0
2
32)
33)
Later on, we show that O≦FLH ≦p. As qL is adjusted in order to bind both constraints,
(ICH) and (PCL) , nH is determined in order to bind (ICH) , (PCH) and (PCL). It is shown
that qH(-q芸>Ql)>1l- Substituting qH or qL into nm(q,;ok) , it is calculated as follows:
方¥9h¥6h)-筈,方XqM-竺堕,方¥qL-A)-生壁空望and方¥1hA)-生地4　　　　　　　　　4　　　　　　　　　　4
By (PCL) and (ICH) , the transfer is as follows:
tL -方¥qL-A)一方{ -ア[5L2 +4Lp△0- (9(Mff -Py +p¥i-pY)(AOY
Q-pY
tH - tL +j(上空㌍)2
-ア[5I?+4LpAO-Wl-pX2^~て　遡壁]・a-py
(34)
(35)
(ICL) is satisfied: tH -tL -吉(空曹Y > Km{qH;9L)-*"(<IIA) - *~"")(r^)(Ae)¥ because4(l-pY
吉(望洋)2 -(ト〝蝣H)(2p-l-pHX△ef常>O. (PCH) must be bound, that is,m-pf
方¥qH-,eH)-tH一方孟-晋[2L+'〝蝣H-(2p +p+3)A6)]-Q _ Weobtain　-吉【2pz+p+3一三㌔詳]蝣"1-p
Substituting /jh , qL is derived as follows:
1l=
4L-(2p-3)AO
12
When (31) is satisfied, the expected profit of the FF is as follows:
ptH + {¥-p)tL -j^[5L2 +4Lp△0+上壁p)(P-M孟)~P2V -P?]{蝉].<X-pY
36
(37)
9) When Ae-葦監(。o=哉-), /%-0 (respectively 〟n-p)-Itisshownthat O≦pH≦p.
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3　Comparison of the output and the expected profit
第11巻第1号
We examine how the asymmetric information affects the output and the expected profit in
the equilibrium. qH and qL with regard to AO can be graphed out with fixing 9L in
Figurel.
q
1h
ll
L/2
qH - (L+AQ)/2
qL= Lf2
l I
qL- (4L -(2p -3)△0)/12
[
qL= {L - (pl¥-p)今o)/2　l
Casel Case2　-　Case3　△0
2(l-p)L/(2p2+p+3) 2Z/(3 -Ip)　L-a+QL-C
Figurel: qH and gL withregardto AO
0
The output of the high demand is always equal to the first-best monopoly output. The
output of the low one is less than the first-best if △β , which is interpreted as the degree of
uncertainty, is relatively small. In this case, the merged firm is under provision. It is equal
to the first-best output if uncertainty is sufficiently large. The reason is that the reservation
payoff depends significantly on the type and this reservation payoff disciplines the DF
without any information rent. Thus the countervailing incentive works and the FF need not
give the incentive and results in assigning the monopoly output, whichever the types are.
Now we are in a position to state the proposition.
Proposition 1. When the degree of uncertainty is small, the output level of the low
type decreases with △0. When it exceeds a threshold, this output level increases with
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Ad. Finally, when it血sufficiently large, this output level is constant.
This proposition implies that as the degree of uncertainty becomes larger, the
countervailing incentive functions more effectively and the FF need not give any
information rent to the DF. When the degree of uncertainty is small, the output level of the
low type is less than the first-best, although the output of the high type is always equal to
the first-best. As the difference of the market size which is the asymmetric information
increases, the first-best output is assigned by the FF. When the difference is sufficiently
large, the merged firm is engaged in producing at the first-best monopoly level.
As for the merger decision by the FF, we are in a position to state the main
proposition.
Proposition 2. The FF acquires greater expected profit by merging with the DF,
whatever the degree of uncertainわ′ is. That is, the FFalways decides to merge.
Proof. We compare the expected profit of the FF in the merger, ptH+(l-p)tL , with
that in the non-merger, nf. In Case 2, the expected profit of the FF in the merger is
denoted by (37). Substituting fiH -0 into (37), (24) is satisfied. That is, the equation
(24) m Case 1 is the special case of (37) m Case 2. First, we consider Case 1 and 2
together. By the above argument, the difference of the expected profit of the FF
between ptH+(1-p)tL and Kf is由Iculated as follows:
ptH+{¥-p)tL一方f-ア[(L-2pAO)2+叫b-元　一p)](AoY　(38)
is calculated by (37) and n/ -旦廷望壁. The first-term of the right-hand side of i36
is positive clearly. The numerator of the占econd-term decreases with !ノ蝣hXO≦pH ≦p).
When /JH-p, this numerator is 9p(¥-p) (A<9) >0. Thus (38) is strictly positive. In
Case 1 and 2, the FF acquires greater expected profit when merging with the DF.
Finally we consider Case 3. 'The expected profits of FF in the merger and the
non-merger are ptH+(1-p)tL -三宅逆and方f -旦鍾二吐respectively. It is clear that36
n* <ptH +(l-p)tL and also in Case 3, the FF acquires larger profit by merging.　□
10) In Case 3, the difference of the expected profit, (38), is equivalent only if nH -p and A0-竜・
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Proposition 2 implies the following: By the merger, the market structure changes from
duopoly to monopoly drastically. From the industrial-wide viewpoint, the optimal
coordination of output by a monopoly firm increases the joint profit of the merged firm.
Adding to this output coordination, the information acquisition through the contract
enables to adjust properly the output level to each demand size and raises the profit. These
two effects exceed the agency cost that arises from giving the information rent and
distorting the output accompanied with rent reduction. When the demand size is private
information for th占FF, the information revelation by the DF through the merger contract
is desirable for the FF, whichever the demand is high or low. The informational problem is
always overcome.
The effects that affect the expected profit can be decomposed into three parts: The first is
the output coordination effect by monopolization. The second is the proper adjustment effect
by information acquisition. The third is the effect of the agency cost incurred by the
information rent to the DF and the distorted output to reduce the rent. In Case 1, the first
and the second effects exceed the third effect although the countervailing effect does not
work. In Case 2, the first and second effects exceed the third effect, which weakens because
the countervailing incentive works in order to bind both participation constraints. In Case 3,
both of the output coordination effect and the proper adjustment effect influence the
expected profit positively. As the FF need not give any information rent to discipline the DF,
the information rent and the distortion on quantity does not occur. As the degree of
uncertainty becomes larger, the countervailing effect to the incentive scheme begins to work
more significantly and attains the efficient output coordination. As a result, informational
distortion does not occur. This is an interesting characteristic of the optimal contract.
We examine how the expected profit of the FF influences by the degree of uncertainty,
△β. By Proposition 2, the expected profit of the FF when merging is always greater than
when not merging, whatever Ad are. However, the difference of the expected profit
between nf and ptH+(l-p)tL does not necessarily enlarge with　△6. In Case 1, the
difference decreases with Ad. In Case 2 and 3, in which the degree of uncertainty is large,
this difference enlarges with　△β.
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4　Concluding remarks
We examined whether or not the merger is the profitable choice for the foreign firm,
taking into consideration the asymmetric information between the foreign firm and the
domestic firm. As a result, the foreign firm always prefers to merge, even if the foreign firm
must pay the information rent to the domestic firm in order to gain private information.
Further we showed the difference of the expected profit between the merger and the
non-merger enlarges as the degree of uncertainty is large.
There are several ways of extension m the paper. In order to analyze the more general
competitive environment in the domestic market, the extension to Cournot oligopolistic
competition by N firms is needed. However, the proper concept of the equilibrium must be
specified under the oligopolistic model. Under the revelation principle that we apply in the
model, the optimal contract does not allow to write down the quantity level of other firms.
Therefore if we extend the oligopolistic competition, the concepts of the reaction function
and the equilibrium need to be reconsidered.
Furthermore, the DF is likely to know more about his own technology than the FF. There
exists the asymmetric information on the private cost that only the DF possesses in general.
Although we focus on the asymmetric information on the common market information. In
this setting, the different offered contract form in merging can be analyzed. Suppose that
there exists the cost difference between the FF and the DF. When the FF offers the contract
to the DF and the DF reports that his private cost is high, the FF may produce by herself.
We presume that the FF delegates all production activities to the DF, since cost is identical.
When the costs are different, we need to examine whether the FF can give the proper
incentive to the DF to report the cost truthfully.
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